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This article examines the place of large studio complexes in plans for the regeneration of inner-
city areas of Sydney, Melbourne and Toronto. Recent developments in each city are placed in the 
context of international audiovisual production dynamics, and are considered in terms of the 
ways they inter- sect with a range of policy thinking. They are at once part of particular urban 
revitalisation agendas, industry development planning, city branding and image-making 
strategies, and new thinking about film policy at national and sub-national levels. The article 
views studio complexes through four frames: as particular kinds of studio complex development; 
as “locomotives” driving a variety of related industries; as “stargates” enabling a variety of 
transformations, including the remediation of contaminated, derelict or outmoded land controlled 
by public authorities or their agents close to the centre of each city; and as components of the 
entrepreneurial, internationally oriented city. 
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This article focuses on the recent transformation of large, inner-urban spaces in 
Sydney, Melbourne and Toronto into Hollywood-standard film studios. Fox 
Studios Australia opened in Sydney in 1998, while both the Central City Studios 
in Melbourne and the Great Lakes Studios in Toronto are expected to be open in 
early 2004. As each is related to large urban regeneration projects that are 
transforming various kinds of public land and buildings close to central business 
districts into commercial, residential, retail and entertainment precincts, they can 
be understood within the framework of urban planning and development policy. 
Each represents a slightly different form of public-private partnership, and 
collectively they reveal something about contemporary entrepreneurial city 
governance dynamics. These studios may also be understood as adjuncts to 
cultural infrastructure building programs, and as forms of “urban entertainment 
development” articulated in public, planning and academic debates about the 
implications of cultural and entertainment developments for both the cultural 
economy and the cultural ecology of cities. Each is a singular development which 
needs to be understood in the context of the politics and history of their respective 
cities; all are projected as “signature”, place-making developments designed to 
secure a competitive edge within the hierarchy of “global cities”. All are designed 
to grow local capacity to service audiovisual production and are oriented primarily 
to footloose, international production, commonly (but not always correctly) known 
as “runaway production”. The studios are points of connection for cities to the 
image and capital flows that constitute “global Hollywood” (Miller et al. 2001), so 
account must also be taken of the dynamics of the global film market and the 
political economy of Anglophone audiovisual production. 
The studios are also points of connection between (and indicators of the 
hierarchies among) different policy agendas – cultural and film, creative 
industries, information and communication technologies, and economic 
development. Studio complexes are more than central planks of film policy 
designed to facilitate filmmaking in a city or a region through a productive 
engagement with the international production industry. They are also much more 
than elements of policy agendas designed to build cultural infrastructure and the 
reputation of a place. These film and cultural policy purposes are made possible 
because the film studio complex has become a core element of larger agendas 
including those of city planning, urban redevelopment, place marketing, tourism 
and services industry growth, and planning for the development of the information 
and communication technologies and creative industries. Analysis of the rationales 
for each indicates common expectations that they will have “locomotive” 
economic effects and occasion a variety of transformations – what we term the 
“stargate” factor. However, each of the rationales also plays down the risks and 
vulnerabilities inherent in providing services to a highly mobile international 
industry. 
Together these studios bring into focus a number of trends in contemporary 
international audiovisual production, cultural policy, and urban planning and 
infrastructure development. We will examine these trends from different 
perspectives in the following sections. First, we consider the inner-city studio as a 
particular kind of cultural infrastructure development. Second, we consider the 
“locomotive” effects proponents claim for studio complexes and high-budget film 
production generally. Third, we will focus on the “stargate” factor, looking at the 
transformative capacities of the studio complex. Fourth, we consider studios in the 
context of entrepreneurial urban governance. Finally, we provide short case 
studies of the Sydney, Melbourne and Toronto studios to analyse the operation of 
these trends and arguments in particular cities. 
The Inner-city Studio Complex 
In his assessment of urban form, Peter Hall (1999, p. 177) sees “larger-scale 
production, including both film and television” as being “invariably displaced to 
peripheral but accessi- ble locations”. This is evident in the outer-urban location of 
such historically important studio complexes as Cinecittà (Rome), Pinewood and 
Shepperton (London), and Babelsberg (Berlin). Many contemporary studio 
developments are similarly located away from the centre of cities, with examples 
including those on the Gold Coast in Queensland, at Serenity Cove in Sydney, and 
in Leavesden, near London. 
A film studio complex is a “space consuming activity”. Studios require large 
buildings for sound stages, production offices, construction workshops and 
dressing rooms, and often space for a backlot – an external controlled environment 
– comprising generic and particular sets. The requisite amount of land is often 
only available in outer metropolitan areas where land is more available and less 
expensive. As Allen J. Scott (2000, p. 103) notes in his discussion of the French 
film industry, production facilities located in the inner city may be pressured by 
competing and more profitable uses of the land – this has in recent years led to the 
loss of some existing film studio infrastructure in Paris. 
Hall (1999, p. 177) argues that activities in the cultural and creative industries 
“tend to be highly agglomerated at the points of consumption, which usually tend 
to be in central parts of the city”. Yet the inner-city location of studio complexes 
such as those in Sydney, Melbourne and Toronto is not driven by a need for 
proximity to consumers; indeed, the fact that film and (most) television production 
is separate in space and time from its audiences facilitated the typical outer-urban 
location of studios. Rather, these inner-city studios are being developed for a 
variety of other reasons. They are convenient for the needs of producers, allowing 
proximity to urban amenities, locations and services (which proponents claim 
provide a competitive advantage in the high-stakes competition for internationally 
mobile audiovisual production). They are anticipated to complement and bring 
new business to existing centrally located media, information and communication 
technology industries and production services, and to spin off benefits for ancillary 
service industries including hospitality and tour- ism (these “locomotive effects” 
are reasons why studios are components of creative industries and economic 
development policymaking). They are symbolic developments that enable a 
variety of transformations and boost a city’s profile and image (what we term the 
“stargate factor”). And they complement urban regeneration efforts particularly 
where there is a need to remediate land from previous manufacturing and heavy 
industry activity (film and television are considered generally environmentally 
friendly and suitably “new economy” forms of production and thus are being 
incorporated in urban planning strategies). 
The Locomotive Effects of Studio Complexes 
An important general rationale for studio complexes is their role in driving 
employment, technological upgrading and the growth of screen and related 
industries. A recent United States Commerce Department report describes 
audiovisual production as a “locomotive” industry because “the number of 
production workers directly working in the industry belies the true impact of the 
industry on the economy because so many upstream, downstream, and peripheral 
industries depend on the primary production plant” (United States International 
Trade Administration 2001, p. 5). The report had been prompted by growing 
concern among American film guilds and labour unions about work being “lost” 
abroad because of lower costs – particularly labour costs. The principal target of 
American ire was Canada, which through the development of a range of economic 
incentives to attract film and television production by governments at all levels, 
was claimed by one American lobby group to be “actively participating in an 
effort to steal the film industry from the US” (cited in Magder & Burston 2001, p. 
208). 
A combination of factors including technological developments, new sources of 
financing, the expansion of infrastructure and the policy attention of a growing 
cohort of national and sub-national governments has enabled film and television 
production to be more widely dispersed around the world than at any time in the 
past. More places are competing for a slice of the lucrative market for 
internationally “footloose” production, primarily but not exclusively Anglophone 
feature films, television series and telemovies. Canada is by no means alone; many 
countries have established incentive programs, typically comprising wage and tax 
credits, because governments and commercial entities have seen the growth of this 
market and become convinced of the benefits that arise from it. Internationally 
mobile production is conceived in many territories as a key driver of 
infrastructural expansion, a motor for research and development, and an 
opportunity to showcase the work of local creatives. 
However, economic incentives are insufficient in themselves for places to compete 
successfully for a substantial and consistent portion of the market. While most of 
those countries with the largest shares of international production (Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland, Mexico, the Czech Republic and New 
Zealand) have established such mechanisms, they complement existing or recently 
developed infrastructure, creative and technical capacity. This infrastructure 
comprises a talent pool, particularly of below-the-line workers providing units or 
crews of the necessary standard; a range of services and service companies both 
directly (e.g., post-production companies, processing laboratories, equip- ment 
hire firms) and indirectly (hotels, restaurants, car rental, airline connections) 
related to production; a variety of natural and built environments for location 
shooting; film-friendly local and national authorities able to assist producers to 
negotiate legal obstacles and obligations; and production facilities such as studio 
complexes comprising soundstages, construction workshops, production offices, 
perhaps a watertank and backlot, and a number of tenant or related service 
companies enabling considerable amounts of work on a project to be conducted on 
a single site. This infrastructure is critical to a place’s prospects of attracting 
regular production work. 
Studio complexes are among the most powerful engines of the locomotive. To 
give an example, the volume of production work and the amount spent on 
production in New South Wales (NSW) has increased markedly since construction 
of the Fox Studios Australia complex began in the mid-1990s. In 1992–1993, 
before Fox Studios was built, NSW’s share stood at 38% (Australian Film 
Commission 1996, p. 55). Between 1998–1999 and 2000–2002, NSW attracted 
almost 54% of total production in Australia – and almost 68% of total feature film 
production – with the now fully-functioning Fox Studios complex a major 
contributing factor (Australian Film Commission 2002). Over the last decade, the 
equivalent figures for Melbourne and Victoria have decreased in proportion to 
NSW’s growth, where prior to the establishment of Fox Studios the two states 
were roughly equal in the total amount of production work hosted. Victoria has 
also lost ground in recent years to Queensland, prima- rily because of the presence 
there of Australia’s other international studio complex, Warner Roadshow Studios. 
The indirect economic impact of production is generally calculated through the 
application of a multiplier, a coefficient used to calculate the change in the input-
output level of an economy as a result of a change in investment. However, the 
impacts in one place are not necessarily comparable to those in another because 
the multiplier used varies considerably depending on the country or region in 
which it is cited, and the body calculating the impact. The variations illustrate the 
difficulties in preparing commensurable statistics, and demonstrate the need for 
more consistency in data collection. They also suggest that while calculations of 
the benefits of large-scale film and television production have been convincing for 
many policymakers, they need to be sceptically interrogated. 
Governmental support for studio complexes has become a key film policy 
initiative alongside the financing of training, production and script development, 
the provision of marketing assistance, and the establishment of a range of tax 
incentives for production. The scale, cost and high profile of these developments 
usually require government involvement not only to negotiate necessary 
bureaucratic procedures (e.g., planning and development applications, 
environmental and heritage assessments), but also to facilitate their establishment 
and operation through investment or low interest loans, or through the provision of 
public land on favourable terms. Studios also typically require considerable 
ongoing support in the form of periodic injections of public funds or largesse. 
They rely upon the kinds of alliances between public and private sector entities 
that characterise broader trends in cultural policy making, but the experience of 
such partnerships on the Gold Coast in Queensland, at Babelsberg in Germany or 
Elstree in London, suggests that public involvement will be long-term and costly 
(see Goldsmith & O’Regan 2003). 
Recent studies (Goldsmith & O’Regan 2003; Krätke 2002b) have shown that 
studio complexes are key nodes in production networks. As creative hubs, studios 
foster innovation and facilitate a variety of creative work both inside and outside 
the complex itself. Filmworkers and service providers are attracted to the area to 
be near the centre of activity and take advantage of opportunities generated by 
production in the complex, but a diverse cohort of other artisans and creative 
workers – games designers, software developers, musicians, animators, model-
makers – are also drawn to the area. The agglomeration or clustering of 
interrelated firms and industries such as that in and around studio complexes can 
have what Scott (2000) has called “emergent effects”, meaning synergies leading 
to innovation. The potential benefits of facilitating these synergies have impelled 
many governments to develop “creative industries” strategies with attention being 
paid to cluster dynamics and infrastructure supportive of such clustering. Because 
studio complexes are both integral elements of such industries and key 
components of service industry-oriented policy development, they have been 
articulated in policy discourse to a range of new economy objectives including 
knowledge generation, fostering innovation and the creation of conditions under 
which creativity can blossom. 
The Stargate Factor 
Another important component of Sydney, Melbourne and Toronto’s push for 
studio complexes is the importance of what we call the “stargate factor” upon the 
city and its reputation. Studio complexes are prestigious symbolic developments 
and portals enabling a variety of transformations. The presence of an international 
standard studio complex and ongoing, high-profile international production can 
contribute to the creation or confirmation of an image of a place as a modern 
media centre and glamorous, state-of-the-art destination. Studio complexes are 
“dream factories”. Filmmaking – and by association, studio complexes – connotes 
glamour and celebrity, and is valued for its stimulation of the imagination and 
contribution to the design or definition of the intangible property of individuals, 
firms and places – their image or reputation. 
It might be argued that the Fox Studios development in Sydney was announced as 
the centrepiece of a long-awaited federal cultural policy in 1994 in part to give 
weight and substance to efforts to project an image of Australia as a technically 
and creatively gifted player in the global audiovisual market. The development 
was also, we would argue, important to Sydney’s image as a global media city 
(Krätke 2002a). As Krätke argues, global media firms establish a presence in a 
city not only as a means to open up markets and increase market share, but in 
order to pick up on trends, capabilities and expertise in key centres. When the Fox 
Studios development was first announced in 1994, the Fox Entertain- ment 
Group’s executive vice president of feature production, Jon Landau, 
acknowledged that the recent success enjoyed by Australian films was one of the 
key factors in the decision to invest in infrastructure in Australia (Anonymous 
1994, p. 4). The establishment of the studio complex confirmed Sydney’s position 
as the primary Australian media production centre, and contributed to the 
representation of Sydney as a modern, high-tech, trend- setting location in the 
lead-up to the 2000 Olympic Games. 
There is, at the level of the project, the transformation of an idea in to a film, and 
the transformation of one space (the sound stage) into any other, real or imagined. 
At the industrial level, the transformation may be of the industrial base and ceiling 
(in terms of ambition) of a place to a new level, as in Melbourne where the 
absence of an international standard studio complex was identified both by an 
industry task force and by independent consultants as an impediment to the city’s 
capacity to attract international production. A new studio complex, it was 
reasoned, would create opportunities for the existing production industry in the 
city just as the Fox Studios complex in Sydney changed the prospects and focus of 
the city’s producers and service providers. An equivalent facility in Melbourne 
would also assist in stemming the temporary and permanent talent drain to studio-
based productions in Sydney and the Gold Coast. 
Studio construction enables a transformation of the built environment. This is 
obvious in the case of new, purpose-built facilities constructed on previously 
vacant land, but there are also more subtle variations. Existing buildings may be 
renovated. Primarily for cost reasons, warehouses, factories, power stations and 
aerodromes have been converted into audiovisual production facilities in different 
parts of the world. The first studio complex in Vancouver was previously a steel-
making plant and a bus depot. In England, the Harry Potter cycle of films are 
being made at a former Rolls Royce aircraft factory and aerodrome at Leavesden 
in Hertfordshire. Here the studio facility will be the centrepiece of a business park 
and media village. In the Czech Republic, an aircraft factory has been converted 
into three sound stages in order to service the growing volume of international 
production initially attracted to Prague by the presence of the historic Barrandov 
Studios. And, in Melbourne, a former Nestlé canning factory on the city’s 
outskirts was temporarily converted to service international production while the 
permanent, purpose-built Central City Studios in the downtown Docklands area 
was constructed. 
Studio Complexes and the Entrepreneurial City 
In many cities around the world, principally those in North America and Europe, 
municipal governments turned to “initiatory and ‘entrepreneurial’” approaches to 
economic development over the last thirty years or so (Harvey 2001, p. 347). In 
these “entrepreneurial city” (Hamnett 2000, p. 169) or “city of enterprise” (Hall 
2002, pp. 379–403) planning frameworks, cities are “economic and cultural 
entities which need to undertake entrepreneurial activities in order to enhance their 
competitiveness” (Hamnett 2000, p. 169). In cities that desire global city status – 
the pinnacle of modern urban aspiration – the object of restructuring is to capture 
the “key control and command functions in high finance, government, or 
information gathering and processing (including the media)” (Harvey 2001, p. 
356). High-budget, studio-based film production requires exactly these functions. 
Studio complexes act as lures to draw in investment and expertise and ideally, 
initiate permanent arrangements (i.e., meaning long-term, multi-project investment 
or co- production agreements between international financiers and locally based 
production enti- ties) and the establishment of branches of major multinational 
production companies to facilitiate “highly efficient and interactive production 
systems” (Harvey 2001, p. 355, citing Scott 1988). High-budget film production 
also requires a range of ancillary services and is often conceived as both an 
adjunct to tourism development strategies and to high-technol- ogy manufacturing 
and service sector development. Coupled with the recent popularity of “creative 
city” approaches to urban governance, a rationale can be built for governmental 
facilitation of studio complex developments in cities such as Sydney, Melbourne 
and Toronto. 
Several benefits are generally considered to flow from such development. New 
work and new money is brought by major international productions. Film 
infrastructure is augmented. Opportunities develop for film and ancillary service 
providers. Film expenditure generates “multiplier effects” in the local economy 
and provides “development leverage” (Logan & Molotch 2002, p. 216) in terms of 
increases in rents, spur to tourist numbers, boost to hotel occupancies, and 
attraction of new business. Filmmaking contributes to urban regeneration and city-
branding, and provides an attendant boost to a city’s standing in tables of global 
cities. However, such rationales often downplay or ignore the inherent 
vulnerability in the positioning of cities as centres of service provision to global 
industries such as film, and the reality that attendant benefits may not be 
sustainable without continuing, costly assistance from the public purse. 
Support for studios is part of the process of reorienting urban infrastructure and 
city economies from traditional manufacturing and heavy industry bases towards 
service industries, information and communication technologies, creative 
industries, entertainment and tourism. The “inner-city” studio developments that 
exemplify our arguments here can be viewed as such reorientation mechanisms, 
and also as elements in the regeneration of downtown or inner-urban areas. These 
areas have been the prime spaces for “enterprise city” regeneration. The 
downtown areas of numerous cities around the world have in recent years 
metamorphosed from wholesale and retail trade districts to recreation and 
corporate service centres (Judd 2002). Such redevelopments are often “supported 
by and produced as expensive infrastructure” (Judd 2002, p. 283) either 
constructed by governments or facilitated by a range of public subsidies and 
public-private partnerships. Facilities for tourists and entertainment “coexist in 
symbiotic relationship with the corporate towers” (Judd 2002, p. 283). In similar 
fashion, many port cities in Europe and North America redeveloped their 
waterfront areas in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the entrepreneurial governance 
strategies to transform manufacturing, transport and communication industry 
bases, and make these spaces available to those with high disposable incomes – a 
group principally comprising young, urban professionals and tourists. Typically 
these redevelopments are central compo- nents of place-marketing strategies 
designed to increase local tourism, and involve dramatic makeovers of urban sites 
that either efface their former uses, remodel them for recreational purposes or alter 
them for consumption by tourists as nostalgic or romanticised places. 
Studios are then in part symbolic developments contributing to the creation of the 
city as a stage (Hall 2002, p. 386). The city-as-stage aspect of the entrepreneurial 
city is designed to make cities “more and more interesting” with urban designers 
intent on regenerating areas for a mix of purposes “offices, retailing, housing, 
entertainment, culture and leisure” (Hall 2002, p. 386) such that the city becomes a 
site of constantly changing attractions drawing in investors, residents, workforce 
and visitors. 
Studio developments, particularly when they form part of larger urban 
regeneration projects, are on a continuum with the public provision of a range of 
cultural and entertain- ment infrastructure (galleries, museums, libraries, 
performing arts centres, sports stadia, motor racing tracks, convention centres and 
theme parks) and new economy infrastructure (business and technology parks). 
Support for studios might be considered as part of what Hannigan (2002, p. 189) 
calls “urban entertainment development”. It is also part of a new cultural and 
urban policy emphasis on infrastructure provision to enhance “quality of life” in 
cities, to attract tourists, to stimulate investment, rejuvenate inner-city areas and 
repopulate these areas with moneyed urban professionals and other new economy 
workers. Hannigan (2002, p. 185) usefully describes “urban entertainment 
development” as a three-way symbiotic partnership among a real estate developer, 
media entertainment firm and public sector agent, where each needs the others’ 
unique expert qualities. Such partnerships amount to something of a “new 
orthodoxy among city politicians and planners which prescribes a central role for 
cities as public partners in mega-project development” (Hannigan 2002, p. 192), 
but the “partnership” may be unequal in that revenue and benefits accruing to the 
government and the city may be outweighed by the costs of involving the private 
partners. 
While they are on a continuum with other forms of cultural infrastructure 
provision, studio complex developments do not quite fit the “urban entertainment 
development” model because unless they have a theme park or studio tour 
component (as Fox Studios in Sydney did until recently), they are not public 
places in that they are not generally publicly accessible, and so are not tourist 
attractions or cultural infrastructure in the same way a museum or sports stadium 
might be. However, they are important parts of the urban entertainment economy, 
they contribute to the making of the city image, and fit neatly within the 
entrepreneurial city frame. Yet, in part because of their separation from the 
consuming public, their role is much less direct as urban entertainment phenomena 
than other such developments, and the criticisms levelled at these developments do 
not uniformly apply to studio complexes. 
Hannigan (2002) recites a number of arguments against the current trend for urban 
entertainment developments. They can be criticised for being top-down and 
undemocratic in the way they limit local and community input. As we outline 
below, this is a charge that has been levelled at both the Sydney and Melbourne 
studios, with some justification. They can be derided as exogenous developments 
parachuted into a location, lacking any organic relation to the communities within 
which they are situated. This might be the case for other forms of cultural 
infrastructure, or for studio developments in places without long histories of film 
and television production, but Sydney, Melbourne and Toronto have long been 
major media centres. The studio developments are then closely related to, even 
dependent on, media activity in each city. It is the case, however that these studios 
do “alter the texture and trajectory of places” (Hannigan 2002, p. 189) in ways 
which transform the character and traditions of a place. As we argue, this is in fact 
one of the fundamental rationales for studio developments, although in Sydney, 
Melbourne and Toronto connections to the former uses and traditions of each site 
have been (albeit tenuously) preserved. This has been accom- plished through 
renovation, rather than destruction, of certain buildings and facilities. In Sydney, it 
was a condition of the lease from the state government that several exhibition 
buildings be maintained. In Toronto, the main power station was able to be 
transformed into soundstages, and offices and a railway spur meant a ready-made 
set. In Melbourne, some historical connections have been maintained through the 
retention of the Docklands name. 
Another argument against urban entertainment developments is that they “siphon 
off money that could otherwise be spent on social and community services such as 
education and low-income housing” (Hannigan 2002, p. 191). It is incontestable 
that many cities in advanced capitalist countries have undergone a “reorientation 
in attitudes to urban governance” from managerialism to entrepreneurialism 
(Harvey 2001, p. 347) in recent decades, albeit to differing degrees. One of the 
manifestations of this has been a reduction of state provision for social and 
community services, but it is difficult to make a direct correlation between the 
amount governments expend facilitating commercial activity through such things 
as studio developments, and a dollar-figure reduction of social welfare. 
Urban entertainment developments are also criticised for the adverse effects they 
have on small-scale, local cultural production and practice by raising property 
prices and rents and so displacing cultural practitioners from redeveloped areas. 
This criticism may have some substance in Sydney’s case, although it is 
unarguable that rising property prices in the suburb in which the studio is located 
are part of a city-wide boom in house prices rather than being the result of an 
isolated local effect. In Melbourne and Toronto, the argument that these 
developments are driving out local cultural practitioners is hard to sustain given 
that both studio developments are in former industrial districts rather than in 
traditional residential and semi-industrial areas. It may well be the case, however, 
that the thousands of apartments that form part of the Melbourne Docklands 
redevelop- ment will be out of range of small-scale cultural producers. It is 
noteworthy that the Melbourne studio operators are contractually bound to make 
the studio spaces available to local film and television productions, although it 
remains to be seen on what scale this will occur. 
Finally, these developments can be regarded as socially exclusionary. Here “a few 
‘prestige’ projects located in the downtown core and along the urban waterfront” 
can be “surrounded by mile after mile of continued decay and despair wherein it is 
difficult to discern any visible benefits for the local residents” (Evans 2001, cited 
in Hannigan 2002, p. 190). Low income and disadvantaged groups are largely 
excluded from participating in the new cultural and urban infrastructures except in 
low-pay service jobs. The studios in Sydney, Melbourne and Toronto certainly do 
represent “prestige” projects, and while the Melbourne and Toronto studios are 
part of larger regeneration developments “decay and despair” have not been and 
will not be eliminated. By its nature, large-scale audiovisual production relies on a 
large cohort of skilled and unskilled workers in which those in “above-the-line” 
positions (key cast, director, producers, writers) may be highly mobile because of 
their level of remuneration, while those in “below-the-line” positions (everyone 
else, from set constructors, grips, camera operators to caterers, drivers and 
ancillary service providers) tend to be locally based. Proponents of the “new 
international division of cultural labour” thesis (see Miller et al. 2001) view 
“below-the-line” workers as most vulnera- ble in the contemporary audiovisual 
production system because, by virtue of international production’s promiscuous 
attraction to certain places based on their (usually temporary) cost advantages and 
their own immobility, these workers have the most to lose from production flight. 
The challenge for policymakers and partners in studio developments is not only to 
attract and retain sufficient volumes of production, but also to ensure that benefits 
flow to local workers both skilled and unskilled. The condition in the Melbourne 
studio contract requiring access for local filmmakers represents one way of 
dealing with this, although it will be some years before it is apparent whether this 
strategy has had the desired effects. By contrast, a suggestion by film unions and 
industry associations that a “local content” requirement be placed on Fox Studios 
Australia provoked the complex management to suggest that such an imposition 
would jeopardise the entire project. In Toronto, there were suggestions that a 
leading Canadian firm, Alliance Atlantis, would be the anchor tenant in the ill-
fated complex on TEDCO land, but there are no requirements on Great Lakes 
Studios to make space available for low-budget domestic feature films. 
We will now describe the intersecting dynamics of each of the preceding sections 
– inner-city studios, “locomotive effects”, “stargate factor” and entrepreneurial 
city governance – through case studies of Sydney, Melbourne and Toronto studio 
developments. 
Case Studies 
Fox Studios, Sydney 
The Fox Studios Australia complex, part of Rupert Murdoch’s entertainment 
empire and where the three Matrix films and the last two instalments of the Star 
Wars cycle were produced, stands on the site of the former Sydney Showgrounds. 
For over a hundred years, this was the home of the Royal Agricultural Society and 
the venue for the annual Royal Easter Show. The complex is in Moore Park, 
adjacent to the Sydney Cricket Ground, at the eastern edge of a band of public 
parklands approximately five kilometres southeast of the centre of Sydney. The 
three parks that comprise the Centennial Parklands (Moore Park, Queens Park and 
Centennial Park) are all heritage listed, and managed by the Centennial Park and 
Moore Park Trust. The Trust is a statutory body established in 1983 and comprises 
eight trustees, seven of whom are appointed by the responsible Minister, currently 
the Premier of New South Wales. Fox Studios Australia leases 29 hectares of 
Moore Park from the Trust, of which the working studio precinct initially 
occupied 11.5 hectares, increasing to 13.2 hectares in 2002. 
The Fox Studios is a mid-1990s development compared to the later Melbourne and 
Toronto initiatives under construction in 2003. It differs from these later 
developments in several crucial ways. It was a federal government initiative 
announced as part of Australia’s first national cultural policy statement, Creative 
Nation. This meant that the studios were initially associated with and took some 
bearing from this federal interest in joining up several previously unrelated or new 
federal cultural initiatives such as the promotion of “commerce in content” to take 
advantage of the global opportunities represented by media conver- gence and new 
communication technologies. 
The Fox complex was developed in the context of Sydney’s successful bid and 
preparations for the 2000 Olympic Games. It was part of the strategies to project 
Sydney and Australia positively to the world as Olympics host. The Olympic 
association was also impor- tant in securing the studios’ inner-city site. In 
November 1989, the Royal Agricultural Society signed a letter of intent for the 
relocation of the Sydney Show from Moore Park to Homebush Bay, which 
became, following the success of Australia’s bid, the main Olympic site. Fox was 
leased this site at the precise point at which an agreement was executed for the 
relocation of the Sydney Show to Homebush Bay. 
The Fox initiative was a high-profile public/private partnership concocted by 
Prime Minister Keating and Rupert Murdoch to secure a film studio complex for 
Syndey owned and run by one of the world’s largest media companies (compare 
this with counterpart studio complexes in Toronto and Melbourne which have not 
secured a Hollywood major partner) (Kitney 1994). Announcements of the plan to 
develop the complex were made on the same day in October 1994 by Murdoch in 
a speech to the annual general meeting of News Corpo- ration shareholders, and 
by Keating in a speech launching “Creative Nation”. Murdoch’s agenda was to 
provide a public face for the complex’s parent company, News Corporation, in its 
home territory, and the Prime Minister’s was to provide a “big picture” 
centrepiece for “Creative Nation”. The Fox initiative was connected by association 
to the Prime Minister’s own larger agenda of national modernisation and his urban 
agenda to ensure that “[o]ur cities must enable us to respond effectively to 
developments in the global economy” while offering “a quality of life that 
enhances our work and recreational well-being” (Keating 1994). The Fox studios, 
in their mix of entertainment, retail spaces, parkland and film and television 
industries, provided for just this mix of global orientation, quality of life and work 
and recreational well-being, but this partnership’s alienation of what had 
previously been publicly accessible land ensured the development would remain 
contentious. 
Considerable assistance from both federal and state governments was necessary to 
transform the Showgrounds into a studio complex. The federal government 
contributed AUS$14 million, while the New South Wales state government bore 
the majority of the cost (estimated at AUS$32 million) of removing asbestos from 
buildings and upgrading water, sewerage and electrical services. The development 
gained final state government approval in May 1996, with certain conditions 
attached. The developers were required to protect and restore 20 heritage-listed 
buildings on the site, and retain the central open-air Showground ring. Footpaths 
and street lighting within and around the facility had to be upgraded, and traffic 
flow problems addressed. In response to community pressure and to indicate that 
this would be a film production facility with a public retail and entertainment area 
rather than a theme park with a production facility attached, “white knuckle” rides 
were banned from the site. The state government agreed a 40-year site lease with 
the operators, Fox Studios Australia, for an annual rent of AUS$2 million. A 
payroll tax concession capped at just over AUS$6 million over seven years was 
approved as an incentive to production. The complex initially comprised six 
soundstages, production offices, a public studio tour, and an entertainment 
precinct including cafes, restaurants, shops and cinemas. Maintaining a substantial 
public area in the complex was an essential prerequisite for approval of the 
development, as one of the objects of the Trust is “to encourage the use and 
enjoyment of the Trust lands by the public by promot- ing and increasing the 
recreational, historical, scientific, educational, cultural and environ- mental value 
of those lands” (Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust Act 1983, Section 8(d)). 
In the decade since the deal, the complex has been a political football. The NSW 
Auditor-General was highly critical of the conduct of the state government in a 
subsequent report which concluded that a proper tendering process had not been 
followed in approving News Corporation’s proposal (Audit Office of New South 
Wales 1997). The development also met with considerable grassroots community 
opposition. A local pressure group, the Save the Showground for Sydney Action 
Group, brought an action in the NSW Land and Environment Court citing 
breaches of planning laws, the absence of adequate public consultation, concern 
over the proposed use of public land and the impact on heritage-listed buildings. 
The Group argued that the development was illegal under legislation introduced 
by the Independent State Member of Parliament (and local member for Moore 
Park), Clover Moore. The legislation sought to prevent the construction of 
medium-density housing on the site and to ensure that the Showgrounds would 
revert to public ownership when the Royal Agricultural Society relo- cated to 
Homebush Bay. However, the Court dismissed the Group’s action in September 
1996. The decision was appealed, but upheld by the NSW Court of Appeal in June 
1997. 
The extensive involvement of public authorities in the development was motivated 
by a number of factors that are paralleled in Melbourne and Toronto. The studio 
complex constitutes a substantial commitment to media production in Sydney and 
filled a gap in the city’s media infrastructure opening up opportunities in the 
production and services sectors. The complex catapulted Sydney to the forefront 
of international media production, and simultaneously reinforced its reputation as 
a global media city. The studio complex cemented Sydney’s position as 
Australia’s primary film and television production venue. In addition, construction 
of the studio complex enabled the remediation of a problem site – the buildings 
were rapidly becoming unfit for public use because of decay and the virtual 
omnipresence of asbestos, and nearby ponds and waterways were being polluted in 
part by run-off from the site.  
Melbourne’s Central City Studios is, like its Toronto counterpart, part of a larger 
redevelopment of a former docklands area. Melbourne’s Docklands covers 
approximately 200 hectares of land and water, and is roughly the same size as the 
adjacent central business district (CBD) (Hamnett 2000, p. 179). From the 1890s 
until the early 1970s it was the city’s main port district. Following the example of 
similar urban redevelopments in cities like London, in 1991 the Victorian state 
government established the Docklands Authority to manage the regeneration of 
the area. During the tenure of Jeff Kennett as Premier of Victoria (1992–1999), 
public participation in and scrutiny of the Authority’s activity were severely 
restricted (Long 1998). The Kennett period was characterised by its embrace of 
entrepreneurial approaches to governance, a massive program of civic 
infrastructure construction, the minimisation of public involvement in planning 
processes, and the “privatisation” of governmental functions. This was part of a 
two-pronged drive to “position Melbourne as the ‘events’ capital of Australia” and 
win for the city “a place in the second ... order” of the global cities’ hierarchy 
(Johnson et al. 1998, p. 440). 
Although the Kennett government was resoundingly defeated in a state election in 
September 1999, the current Labor government under Steve Bracks has 
maintained many Kennett-era initiatives, including Docklands. The 
redevelopment, divided into eight “precincts” composed of residential, 
commercial, retail and entertainment developments principally financed through 
private-sector investment, has had a chequered history littered with accusations 
that public planning processes have been abused or ignored in the all- consuming 
effort to facilitate corporate investment (Long 1998; Johnson et al. 1998; Alomes 
2000). 
In 1997, the Entertainment City 2000 consortium initially comprising Viacom Inc. 
(Paramount Studios’ parent company), production company Crawfords Australia, 
Australian regional television network WIN Television, Thorney Holdings (the 
investment arm of Visy Industries), and Macquarie Bank, was named as a 
“preferred bidder” for the North West Precinct. The consortium proposed building 
a film studio as part of an 89-acre entertainment precinct alongside a theme park, 
multiplex cinema and themed hotel. The plan was opposed by other industry 
players, particularly the rival Village Roadshow organization, joint owner of the 
Warner Roadshow complex on the Gold Coast. The consortium had persistent 
problems in raising the necessary capital, and plans for a public float were shelved 
in early 2000 due to a lack of institutional investor interest. 
The Bracks state government commissioned a review of the business case for a 
studio following the collapse of the Entertainment City 2000 bid. At the same 
time, an industry task force was appointed to report on the current state and future 
needs of Victorian film and television producers and service providers. Both 
reports identified a studio-sized gap in Victoria’s production infrastructure that put 
the state at a significant disadvantage in its efforts to compete for lucrative high-
budget international production. Both reports recom- mended that a studio 
complex was necessary to grow the industry, but without substantial government 
support, it was unlikely that such a development would be financed from private-
sector sources alone. 
The state government was convinced to continue efforts to attract private-sector 
interest. Tenders calling for a pared down studio complex development, minus the 
theme park, were put out in June 2001. In the same month, the government 
endorsed a AUS$40 million funding allocation for the development. A Project 
Steering Committee, comprising representatives of various government 
departments and agencies, was appointed to over- see the process and develop an 
interim facility “to take advantage of any current productions that may be 
interested in moving to Melbourne and to allow the market to build in time for the 
opening of the film and studio complex at Docklands” (Auditor General Victoria 
2003, p. 168). A budget of AUS$1.2 million was allocated to finance a two-year 
lease from March 2002 on a 12,000m2 former Nestlé canning factory on the 
outskirts of Melbourne. Five expressions of interest in operating the Docklands 
facility were received by September 2001. A shortlist of three consortia was drawn 
up, and in January 2002 Central City Studios (CCS) was announced as the 
preferred tenderer. 
CCS’s proposal included a state government loan of up to AUS$31.5 million at an 
interest rate of 2.75% to construct the studio and associated works; a 20-year lease 
over the studio site; a 99-year lease over related land for soundstages; a payment 
of AUS$3 million for land for the surrounding commercial cluster development; 
and acceptance of costs up to AUS$1 million for land remediation. The loan 
agreement between the state government and CCS includes a number of key 
performance indicators against which the achievement of the state’s objectives can 
be measured. These objectives are to: increase both Australian and international 
film and television production in Victoria; to create an accessible and competi- 
tive environment for Australian film and television production in Victoria; to 
create a local film and television production industry capable of competing 
internationally; and to develop a film and television industry cluster on and around 
the studio complex. The key perfor- mance indicators include requirements that 
the soundstages be in use at least 70% of the time; that the complex will attract a 
production spend of at least AUS$100 million above current levels (roughly 
double); that at least AUS$25 million of the additional production spend be on 
productions qualifying as Australian; and that the facility be “open-access”, with 
no requirements on hirers to use any particular services or service companies. CCS 
is also required to contribute at least AUS$600,000 per annum to a Foundation for 
Industry Development, which is designed to address the critical issue of training of 
filmworkers. 
Great Lakes Studio, Toronto 
The transformation of Toronto’s 46 kilometres of waterfront land has long been a 
preoccupation of city planners, and the subject of numerous reports. However, it 
was not until three levels of government (the City of Toronto, the Province of 
Ontario and the national Canadian government) came together in 1999 to create 
first, a Waterfront Revital- ization Taskforce, and subsequently the Toronto 
Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, that efforts to address the immensity of the 
project gained substantial financial backing. Some of the land had been identified 
as the likely site for Toronto’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. Each government 
contributed CA$500 million to begin the long, multi-billion dollar process. The 
task force report made a series of recommendations to create public parklands, 
cultural and tourism facilities, residential, retail and entertainment precincts, and a 
“Convergence Centre” to focus Toronto’s strengths in media, communications and 
knowledge-based industries (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force 2000, 
p. 16). In March 2001, four initial revitalization projects were announced, with 
CA$61 million allocated to the preparation of the Port Lands district for cultural, 
residential, recreational and commercial uses. 
The idea of constructing a studio complex was consistent with many of the 
objectives of the revitalization project, but the spirit of cooperation and 
coordination among the three levels of government that informed the 
establishment of the task force does not appear to have filtered down to those on 
the ground. Within the space of a few months in 2002, two competing studio 
complex developments had been announced for separate areas of “public” land in 
the Port Lands district. One was to be built by a consortium including the United 
Kingdom’s Pinewood Shepperton Studios on land controlled by the Toronto 
Economic Development Corporation (TEDCO), a business corporation in which 
the City of Toronto is the sole shareholder. The other complex, Great Lakes 
Studios, is located on the site of a decommissioned power station on land owned 
by a crown corporation, Ontario Power Generation. The Great Lakes Studios also 
boasts expertise in studio development and management; it is a joint venture 
between Studios of America and Paul Bronfman’s Comweb Group which was 
involved in the development of what is now Lion’s Gate Studios in Vancouver, 
and which also operates the Ciné Cité studio complex in Montreal. 
Film industry representatives and agencies have long argued that a state-of-the-art 
studio complex is needed in order to cement Toronto’s position as a global media 
city. Toronto currently hosts the majority of the approximately CA$1 billion worth 
of film and television production work made in Ontario every year. It is the centre 
of English Canadian television production, and a leading venue for international 
film production. The city boasts many sound stages and production facilities, but 
most are converted buildings, and few are capable of servicing highly coveted 
blockbuster special effects driven feature films. For Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman, 
the studio complex development would “anchor” the city’s film industry, while 
Michael Grade, chair of Pinewood Shepperton Studios, told a press conference 
called to announce his group’s successful tender for the TEDCO site that a 
mammoth studio complex was essential for Toronto’s growth and ambition: 
“You’ve got a fantastic movie industry in this country ... what you don’t have is 
the facilities to match that. That is why you will move up the league table with this 
facility” (Kalinowski 2002, p. B04; Nickle 2002) 
The first steps up the league table were taken when ground clearing began at the 
Great Lakes Studios site in October 2002. While there was general consensus that 
Toronto needed a mega studio complex, few were convinced that it could support 
two. In April 2003, the preferred tenderers for the TEDCO site withdrew, citing an 
inability to attract commercial tenants and financial backing for the CA$150 
million project. TEDCO still has plans for a studio complex despite the loss of the 
first choice operators, and despite the fact that a partner in a losing bid, the 
facilities and studio complex operators Comweb Corporation, is now one of the 
backers of the Great Lakes Studios. 
The regeneration of Toronto’s Waterfront is a much larger project than either 
Melbourne’s Docklands or the Centennial Parklands. The size of the task and the 
involvement of multiple levels of government augments the difficulties of 
coordinating the responsible agents and interested parties. These difficulties 
contributed to a situation in which agencies of the municipal and provincial 
governments found themselves in competition over the construction of a studio 
complex as both sought to pursue the objectives of the revitalization project. 
Conclusion 
The kind of production enabled by large studio complexes – such as The Matrix or 
Star Wars – is characterised as both a “locomotive” driving employment and 
activity in a variety of related and peripheral industries, and as a high-profile 
vehicle for the positive projection of the city, state and even nation. These latter 
“stargate” aspects envisage the studio complex acting as a conduit for the 
transformation of the industry, locations and image of a city. Here the celebrity, 
glamour and buzz attaching to film production are enrolled in the promotion of the 
city as a modern media centre, a desirable tourist destination and an inspiring 
place to live and work. Each development promises to provide the means to add, 
either on-screen or behind the camera, a local flavour to high-budget, prestige 
productions destined for the international market. At the same time, these projects 
provide the means for the local to be transformed beyond recognition in the quest 
for “locational verisimilitude” – the capacity of one city/studio/set to stand in for 
another. Such arguments for studio complexes find fertile ground in urban 
infrastructure development frameworks for the reno- vation of central parts of the 
city. They come together in the promotion of these large-scale studio complexes as 
inner- rather than outer-city developments. 
The studio complexes in Sydney, Melbourne and Toronto illustrate how cultural 
and film policy initiatives can be largely carried out by, furthered and ultimately 
depend upon entities drawn from outside the traditional cultural and film agencies 
and their film support and policy infrastructures. In this process, these film and 
cultural policy initiatives are inevitably redrawn and rethought (“disciplined” and 
transformed) so as to fit the priorities of urban design and larger information and 
communication technology, services and creative industries frameworks. For these 
new cultural policy actors, the studio complex is both an important film 
production infrastructure and valued for the support it gives to larger urban 
ambitions. 
However, the positioning of such cities as centres of service provision to global 
indus- tries such as international film production requires often costly 
infrastructure provision – in our case, the “serial reproduction” (Harvey 2001, p. 
358) of studio complex developments – and brings with it an increased 
vulnerability to the effects of external forces, market disrup- tions and fluctuations 
in foreign exchange levels. In 2000–2001, Canadian and Australian cities 
benefited from production fleeing the United States to circumvent the effects of 
threatened industrial action, but in 2003 production in Toronto dipped in the wake 
of the SARS epidemic, while Australian venues – principally the Gold Coast, but 
also Sydney and Melbourne – lost a temporary competitive edge when the 
Australian dollar strengthened against the American dollar. These cities and 
studios are competing against each other on the basis of their ability to provide a 
range of generic skills, services and expertise to individ- ual films, augmented by 
what are claimed to be unique or compelling local advantages (e.g., the 
availability of particular creative individuals or firms, or the proximity of specific 
loca- tions). Yet the entry of a new city into the market for international 
production, or efforts to shore up the position of existing cities through the 
construction of production infrastructure or the provision of tax incentives and 
subsidies, actually serves to add to the vulnerability of all players. The mobility of 
production (and the capital that enables it) is actually increased with producers and 
financiers having greater choice over location as the costs of locational change 
diminish. As Harvey argues, this greater choice available to producers and capital 
highlights the importance of particular production conditions prevailing at a particular 
place. Small differences in labor supply (quantities and qualities), in infrastructures and 
resources, in government regulation and taxation, assume much greater significance than 
was the case when high transport costs created “natural” monopolies for local production 
in local markets. (Harvey 2001, p. 358) 
Policymaking, and agencies such as film commissions whose job it is to grow a 
city’s foothold in the market for international production, must continuously 
innovate in order to differentiate one city from another and gain (or retain) a 
competitive advantage, as it is inevitable that these innovations will be imitated 
and improved upon elsewhere. The reality is that while film production can be 
championed as a clean, green, archetypal new economy industry which promises a 
range of direct (film industry employment and growth) and indirect (other cultural 
industry or services industry growth) economic benefits, the reality is that the 
condition for most cities will not be one of constant growth, but rather one of a 
cycle of boom and depression, where the only permanently advantaged player in 
the game is the internationally mobile production. 
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